It is therefore obvious to the least intelligent mind, to account why, great power in the hands of a magistrate, and that power connected, with a considerable duration, may be dangerous to the liberties of a republic—the deposit of vast trusts in the hands of a single magistrate, enables him in their exercise, to create a numerous train of dependants—this tempts his ambition, which in a republican magistrate is also remarked, to be pernicious and the duration of his office for any considerable time favours his views, gives him the means and time to perfect and execute his designs—he therefore fancies that he may be great and glorious by oppressing his fellow citizens, and raising himself to permanent grandeur on the ruins of his country.—And here it may be necessary to compare the vast and important powers of the president, together with his continuance in office with the foregoing doctrine—his eminent magisterial situation will attach many adherents to him, and he will be surrounded by expectants and courtiers—his power of nomination and influence on all appointments—the strong posts in each state comprised within his superintendance, and garrisoned by troops under his direction—his controul over the army, militia, and navy—the unrestrained power of granting pardons for treason, which may be used to screen from punishment, those whom he had secretly instigated to commit the crime, and thereby prevent a discovery of his own guilt—his duration in office for four years: these, and various other principles evidently prove the truth of the position—that if the president is possessed of ambition, he has power and time sufficient to ruin his country.
(Emphasis my own.)
This quote is from “Cato IV”, an essay published in 1787. It is one of the Anti-Federalist Papers that argued against ratification of the Constitution, in this case arguing that the powers of the presidency were too broad and held for too long.
While not all of Cato IV holds up – nobody has reason to care nowadays that the state that the vice president comes from technically gets a bit of a boost in the Senate, nor could one imagine any presidency or premiership being usefully held for just one year – I fear that we are all about to learn the hard way that the Anti-Federalist’s fear that the presidency could become tantamount to an elective monarchy was not unjustified.
In “Federalist No. 69”, Alexander Hamilton argued that the presidency had a built-in accountability mechanism (as compared to the British monarchy) in the form of impeachment:
The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. The person of the king of Great Britain is sacred and inviolable; there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is amenable; no punishment to which he can be subjected without involving the crisis of a national revolution. In this delicate and important circumstance of personal responsibility, the President of Confederated America would stand upon no better ground than a governor of New York, and upon worse ground than the governors of Maryland and Delaware.
What Hamilton did not anticipate or ignored was the possibility that the president could end up commanding a “train of dependants” who would refuse to hold him to account.
I will not sugarcoat: we are in a dangerous time for the American Republic, and I make no apology for this post being more political than the ones in the past couple years. But regardless of your own views on the current situation, please at least consider this: the U.S. Constitution was the work of humans, not demigods, and it was contested. It may be time to start reading and considering some of the arguments made against it and understand why the current form of the presidency had its critics all the way back to the 1780s.
